At a time when the global landscape looks pretty good for the United States, why does it feel so bad? That’s a riddle the Biden administration needs to solve.

I don’t want to sound like the perpetually optimistic Dr. Pangloss. But let’s step back and think about the positives in national security policy. We’ll explore the angst later, but by many important metrics, the world is going America’s way.

Russia’s failure to achieve its objectives in Ukraine is the most stunning gain. At relatively small cost to the United States (although with terrible suffering for brave Ukrainians), a Russia that had seemed the dominant military power in Europe has effectively been neutered as a conventional threat.

Europe’s unity in the Ukraine crisis has been a remarkable success. European nations have shown they can act coherently and accept (even welcome) strong American leadership. Europe has stuck together because it has rediscovered its values and its backbone. The United States and Europe aren’t from different planets anymore. When it comes to combating Russian aggression, both are in the vicinity of Mars.

Advertisement

The West is stronger, however the Ukraine war ends, because Europe has weaned itself from Russian energy. Eighteen months ago, when Russian President Vladimir Putin was demanding a new security map for Europe, Europeans were still depending on Moscow for oil and gas — and putting their economic interests above their values. That has changed. Principle won out.

NATO, the bedrock of Western security, is vastly stronger, too. With the addition of Finland, and eventually Sweden, NATO’s center of gravity has shifted north, to these new members, and east toward Poland and the Baltic states. More than before, the alliance will be shaped by countries that know the Russian threat up close.

Americans are newly anxious about a rising China, to be sure. But even in Asia, U.S. alliances are stronger than they’ve been in years. Japan has become a true security partner, facilitating regional cooperation with South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam. And the AUKUS nuclear submarine pact with Australia and Britain is worth most of the hype. It brings Europe’s strongest military power into the Indo-Pacific.

Advertisement

Now for the “feel bad” part. At a recent gathering of prominent foreign policy pundits and think-tankers, a.k.a. “the Blob,” a deepening pessimism about the United States’ strategic position was pervasive. Why?

U.S. national security policy seems to be less than the sum of its parts because the Biden administration hasn’t communicated a cohesive strategic vision. There’s no nice way to put this: All the top administration officials need to be better and more forceful communicators. That includes the president and vice president, and the secretaries of state, defense and treasury.

Messaging isn’t simply a matter of giving speeches and news conferences. The principals have to know what they want to say. And the Biden administration is weak here, as well. Some strategic puzzles seem to have been put in the “too hard” pile.

Advertisement

Let’s start, again, with Ukraine. The administration hasn’t articulated a coherent endgame for the war. President Biden says he wants a settlement. But the negotiating condition that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has set — liberation of all Russian-occupied territory, including Crimea — probably can’t be achieved soon, according to Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Because of that, critics argue that what we have is a strategy for stalemate in Ukraine rather than success. We can’t go forward to help Ukraine attack Russian bases in Crimea and across the border because Biden (rightly, in my view) thinks the risk of direct U.S.-Russian conflict is too great. We can’t go backward to a cease-fire because it would reward Russian gains and betray Ukraine.

So, the Ukrainians fight on “for as long as it takes.” The implication is that Russia will bleed out faster than Ukraine. I doubt it. So, let’s be honest, this strategy makes sense only if Ukraine can deliver a counteroffensive that would push Russia back far enough that Zelensky can persuade his country to begin talks over Crimea and other tricky issues. If that’s so, Zelensky needs every ounce of American firepower he can get, now.

Advertisement

China is the issue where Biden’s messaging problem is most acute. Biden says he wants both competition and cooperation. But the first basket is overflowing, while the latter is almost empty. Chinese diplomats have privately been briefing world leaders in recent days that the United States wants only confrontation and that dialogue is useless. But at the same time, they’ve sent quiet signals inviting high-level American contact.

The United States is still the big guy in foreign affairs, the adult in the room. If Biden truly doesn’t want a new Cold War with China, he needs to say so forcefully — and directly to Beijing. He needs to rebuild the floor for cooperation that he set with Chinese President Xi Jinping at their summit in Bali in November. Climate change is the most obvious area for cooperation, but perhaps Ukraine is, too. Zelensky has indicated he wants Chinese help in finding a just peace.

Biden is looking for the sweet spot: Stopping Russian aggression without triggering a catastrophe; curbing China without sliding toward war. He needs to articulate those goals more clearly and use America’s immense power to achieve them.

ncG1vNJzZmivp6x7uK3SoaCnn6Sku7G70q1lnKedZLyxtc2ipqerX2d9c3%2BOaWtoaGZkrq6x0aKammWnpL%2BtsIyfpqudmZy7brzOpaCcsV2Ytaq6wGaspKqRnrumew%3D%3D